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Abstract
We introduce the notions of w-lower semicontinuous and almost w-lower
semicontinuous correspondence with respect to a given set and prove a new
fixed-point theorem. We also introduce the notion of correspondence with
e-LSCS-property. As applications we obtain some new equilibrium theorems
for abstract economies and for generalized multiobjective games.
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1. Introduction
In [16] W. Shafer and H. Sonnenschein proved the existence of equilibrium
of an economy with finite dimensional commodity space and irreflexive pref-
erences represented as correspondences with open graph. They generalized
the work of J. Nash [14], who first proved a theorem of equilibrium existence
for games where the player’s preferences are representable by continuous
quasi-concave utilities and the work of G. Debreu, who proved the existence
of equilibrium in a generalized N-person game or an abstract economy [3].
N. C. Yannelis and N. D. Prahbakar [20] developed new techniques based on
selection theorems and fixed-point theorems. Their main result concerns the
existence of equilibrium when the constraint and preference correspondences
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have open lower sections. They worked within different framework (count-
able infinite number of agents, infinite dimensional strategy spaces). K. J.
Arrow and G. Debreu proved the existence of Walrasian equilibrium in [1].
To sum up, the significance of equilibrium theory stems from the fact that it
develops important tools to prove the existence of equilibrium for different
types of games.
A. Borglin and H. Keiding [2] used new concepts of K. F.-correspondences
and K. F.-majorized correspondences for their existence results. The second
notion was extended by Yannelis and Prabhakar [20] to L-majorized corre-
spondences. In [21], G. X. Yuan proposed a model of abstract economy more
general than that introduced by A. Borglin and H. Keiding in [2], meaning
that each constraint mapping has been divided into two parts, A and B, be-
cause the set of the fixed points of the ”small” correspondence may not be
rich enough.
Most of the existence theorems of equilibrium deal with preference cor-
respondences which have lower open sections or are majorized by correspon-
dences with lower open sections. Within the last years, some existence results
were obtained for lower semicontinuous and upper semicontinuous correspon-
dences. Some results concerning fixed point theorems for lower semicon-
tinuous correspondences or equilibrium existence for economies with lower
semicontinuous and Q-majorized correspondences can be found in [4], [5],
[10], [18]. E. Michael gave some selection theorems for lower semicontinuous
correspondences. His main results can be found in [11]-[13].
In this paper, we define several types of correspondences: w-lower semi-
continuous and almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to a given set
and also correspondences having e-LSCS-property. We prove a fixed point
theorem for almost w-lower semicontinuous correspondences. This result is
a Wu like fixed point theorem [18]. We use this theorem to prove the equi-
librium existence for abstract economies which have w-lower semicontinuous
constraint correspondences. We use a technique of approximation to prove
an equilibrium existence theorem for correspondences with e-LSCS-property.
We give slight generalizations of the equilibrium notions defined by W.
K. Kim and X. P. Ding in [9] and we also prove the existence of general-
ized weighted Nash equilibrium and of generalized Pareto equilibrium for a
generalized multiobjective game having w-lower semicontinuous constraints.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains pre-
liminaries and notation. The fixed point theorem is presented in Section 3
and the equilibrium theorems are stated in Section 4. Section 5 contains
2
the model of a constrained multiobjective game and a Pareto equilibrium
existence result.
2. Preliminaries and notation
We shall denote by Rm+ := {u = (u1, u2, ..., um) ∈ R
m : uj ≥ 0 ∀j =
1, 2, ..., m} and intRm+ := {u = (u1, u2, ..., um) ∈ R
m : uj > 0 ∀j = 1, 2, ..., m}
the non-negative othant of Rm and respective the non-empty interior of Rm+
with the topology induced in terms of convergence of vector with respect to
the Euclidian metric. For each u, v ∈ Rm, u ·v denote the standard Euclidian
inner product.
Now we present some notations and results concerning the theory of cor-
respondences.
Let A be a subset of a topological space X . F (A) denotes the family of
all nonempty finite subset of A. 2A denotes the family of all subsets of A.
clA denotes the closure of A in X . If A is a subset of a vector space, coA
denotes the convex hull of A. If F , G : X → 2Y are correspondences, then
coG, clG, G∩F : X → 2Y are correspondences defined by (coG)(x) =coG(x),
(clG)(x) =clG(x) and (G∩F )(x) = G(x)∩F (x) for each x ∈ X , respectively.
The graph of T : X → 2Y is the set Gr(T ) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | y ∈ T (x)}.
The correspondence T is defined by T (x) = {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈clX×YGrT}
(the set clX×YGr(T ) is called the adherence of the graph of T ). It is easy to
see that clT (x) ⊂ T (x) for each x ∈ X.
Remark 1. T (x) =clT (x) for each x ∈ X if T has a closed graph in X × Y
(by Theorem 7.1.15 in [8], it follows that in particular, T has a closed graph
when Y is regular and clT is upper semicontinuous with closed values).
Let X , Y be topological spaces and T : X → 2Y be a correspondence.
T is said to be lower semicontinuous (l.s.c) if for each x∈ X and each open
set V in Y with T (x) ∩ V 6= ∅, there exists an open neighbourhood U of x
in X such that T (y) ∩ V 6= ∅ for each y ∈ U . T : X → 2Y is said to be
almost lower semicontinuous if for each x ∈ X and each open set V in Y
with T (x)∩V 6= φ, there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that
T (x) ∩ V 6= φ for each z ∈ U.
For some known results about lower semicontinuity, which will be used
in our proofs, we refer the reader to [8].
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Proposition 1. (Lemma 1 in [17], Proposition 2.5 in [11]). Let X and Y
be topological spaces and let T1, T2 be two l.s.c correspondences from X to
Y. If T1 has open values and T1(x) ∩ T2(x) 6= ∅, for every x ∈ X, then, the
correspondence T defined by T (x) = T1(x) ∩ T2(x) is l.s.c too.
Proposition 2. (Theorem 1.6, pag 25 in [21]). Let X be a topological space,
E be a topological vector space and Y be a non-empty subset of E. Suppose S :
X → 2Y is a lower semicontinuous correspondence and V is any nonempty
open subset of E. Then the correspondence T : X → 2Y defined by T (x) =
(S(x) + V ) ∩ Y for each x ∈ X has an open graph in X × Y.
We also need a version of Lemma 1.1 in [21]. For the reader’s convenience,
we include its proof below.
Lemma 3. Let X be a topological space, Y be a nonempty subset of a locally
convex topological vector space E and T : X → 2Y be a correspondence. Let
ß be a basis of neighbourhoods of 0 in E consisting of open absolutely convex
symmetric sets. Let D be a compact subset of Y . If for each V ∈ß, the
correspondence T V : X → 2Y is defined by T V (x) = (T (x) + V )∩D for each
x ∈ X, then ∩V ∈ßT V (x) ⊆ T (x) for every x ∈ X.
Proof. Let be x and y be such that y ∈ ∩V ∈ßT V (x) and suppose, by way
of contradiction, that y /∈ T (x). This means that (x, y) /∈clGrT, so that there
exists an open neighborhood U of x and V ∈ß such that:
(U × (y + V ))∩GrT = ∅. (1)
Choose W ∈ß such that W −W ⊆ V (e.g. W = 1
2
V ). Since y ∈ TW (x),
then (x, y) ∈clGrTW , so that
(U × (y +W )) ∩GrTW 6= ∅.
There are some x′ ∈ U and w′ ∈ W such that (x′, y + w′) ∈GrTW , i.e.
y+w′ ∈ TW (x′). Then, y+w′ ∈ D and y+w′ = y′+w
′′
for some y′ ∈ T (x′)
and w
′′
∈ W. Hence, y′ = y + (w′ − w
′′
) ∈ y + (W −W ) ⊆ y + V, so that
T (x′) ∩ (y + V ) 6= ∅. Since x′ ∈ U, this means that (U × (y + V ))∩GrT 6= ∅,
contradicting (1).
We present first Wu’s Theorem 1 in [18], which will be generalized in the
next section.
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Theorem 4 (18). Let I be an index set. For each i ∈ I, let Xi be a
nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space
Ei, Di a non-empty compact metrizable subset of Xi and Si, Ti : X → 2
Di
two correspondences with the following conditions:
1) for each x ∈ X :=
∏
i∈I
Xi, clcoSi(x) ⊂ Ti(x) and Si(x) 6= ∅;
2) Si is lower semicontinuous.
Then there exists x∗ ∈ D =
∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗
i ∈ Ti(x
∗) for each i ∈ I.
In the present paper, our purpose is to give a fixed point theorem and to
research the equilibrium existence problem for abstract economies. In order
to establish our main results, we introduce the following definitions.
Let X be a topological space, Y be a nonempty subset of a topological
vector space E and D be a subset of Y .
Definition 1. The correspondence T : X → 2Y is said to be w-lower semi-
continuous (weakly lower semicontinuous) with respect to D if there exists
a basis ß of open symmetric neighbourhoods of 0 in E such that, for each
V ∈ß, the correspondence T V is lower semicontinuous, where T V (x) =
(T (x) + V ) ∩D for each x ∈ X,.
Remark 2. By Lemma 2.6 in [19], it follows that if the correspondence T :
X → 2Y is almost lower semicontinuous, then it is w-lower semicontinuous
with respect to Y.
Definition 2. The correspondence T : X → 2Y is said to be almost w-lower
semicontinuous (almost weakly lower semicontinuous) with respect to D if
there exists a basis ß of open symmetric neighbourhoods of 0 in E such that,
for each V ∈ß, the correspondence T V is lower semicontinuous.
Example 1. Let T1 : (0, 2)→ 2
[1,4] be the correspondence defined by
T1(x) =


[2− x, 2], if x ∈ (0, 1);
{4} if x = 1;
[1, 2] if x ∈ (1, 2).
T1 is not lower semicontinuous on (0, 2).
Let D = [1, 2] and let V = (−ε, ε), ε > 0, be an open symmetric neigh-
bourhood of 0 in R. Then, it results that
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for ε ∈ (0, 1),
T V1 (x) = (T1(x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩D =


(2− x− ε, 2], if x ∈ (0, 1− ε];
[1, 2] if x ∈ (1− ε, 1) ∪ (1, 2);
φ if x = 1;
,
for ε ∈ [1, 2],
T V1 (x) = (T1(x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩D =
{
[1, 2], if x ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2);
φ if x = 1;
if ε ∈ (2, 3],
T V1 (x) = (T1(x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩D =
{
[1, 2] if x ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2);
(4− ε, 2] if x = 1;
and if ε > 3,
T V1 (x) = (T1(x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩D = [1, 2] if x ∈ (0, 2).
Then,
for ε ∈ (0, 1),
T V1 (x) =
{
[2− x− ε, 2], if x ∈ [0, 1− ε);
[1, 2] if x ∈ (1− ε, 2];
and
for ε ≥ 1,
T V1 (x) = [1, 2] for x ∈ [0, 2].
For each V = (−ε, ε) with ε > 0, the correspondences T V1 and T
V
1 are
lower semicontinuous and T V1 has nonempty values. We conclude that T1
is w-lower semicontinuous with respect to D and it is also almost w-lower
semicontinuous with respect to D.
Proposition 5. Let X be a topological space, Y be a nonempty subset of
a topological vector space E. If the correspondence T : X → 2Y is lower
semicontinuous and nonempty valued, then it is also w-lower semicontinuous
with respect to any set D ⊂ Y with the property that T (x)∩D 6= φ, for every
x ∈ X.
Proof. Let V be an open symmetric neighborhood of 0 in E. Since the
constant valued correspondence x → V is lower semicontinuous, it follows
that so it is the correspondence x → (T (x) + V ). Note also that this cor-
respondence has nonempty open values and that (T (x) + V ) ∩ D 6= ∅ for
every x ∈ X. Further, Proposition 1 can be applied for T1(x) = T (x) + V
and T2(x) = D, x ∈ X.
Remark 3. If the corespondence T V has empty values for some open set
V, it may not be lower semicontinuous. The following example proves this
assertion.
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Example 2. Let T1 : [0, 2]→ 2
[3,5) be the correspondence defined by
T1(x) =
{
[x+ 2, 4] if x ∈ [0, 1];
(4, 5) if x ∈ (1, 2];
.
Let V = (−1, 1) and D = [0, 3]. Then,
T
(−1,1)
1 (x) =
{
(x+ 1, 5) if x ∈ [0, 1];
(3, 6) if x ∈ (1, 2];
∩ [0, 3] =
{
(x+ 1, 3] if x ∈ [0, 1];
φ if x ∈ (1, 2];
T
(−1,1)
1 is not lower semicontinuous.
Remark 4. T V may not have convex values, even if T V is convex valued.
Example 3. Let D = [1, 2] and T : [0, 2] → 2[0,4) be the correspondence
defined by
T (x) =


[0, 1] if x ∈ [0, 1);
φ if x = 1;
(2, 3) if x ∈ (1, 2].
T is lower semicontinuous on [0, 2].
If ε ∈ (0, 1
2
), T V (x) =


[1, 1 + ε) if x ∈ [0, 1);
φ if x = 1;
(2− ε, 2] if x ∈ (1, 2].
Then, if ε ∈ (0, 1
2
), T V (x) =


[1, 1 + ε] if x ∈ [0, 1);
[1, 1 + ε] ∪ [2− ε, 2] if x = 1;
[2− ε, 2] if x ∈ (1, 2];
for V =
(−ε, ε).
T V does not have convex values in every point x ∈ [0, 2].
We also define the dual w-lower semicontinuity with respect to a set.
Definition 3. Let T1, T2 : X → 2
Y be correspondences. The pair (T1, T2)
is said to be dual almost w-lower semicontinuous (dual weakly lower semi-
continuous) with respect to D if there exists a basis ß of open symmetric
neighbourhoods of 0 in E such that, for each V ∈ß, the correspondence
T V(1,2) : X → 2
D is lower semicontinuous, where T V(1,2) : X → 2
D is defined by
T V(1,2)(x) = (T1(x) + V ) ∩ T2(x) ∩D for each x ∈ X.
Example 4. Let D = [1, 2], T1 : (0, 2) → 2
[1,4] be the correspondence from
the example 1 and T2 : (0, 2)→ 2
[2,3] be the correspondence defined by
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T2(x) =
{
[2, 3], if x ∈ (0, 1];
{2} if x ∈ (1, 2);
.
The correspondences T1 and T2 are not semicontinuous.
For ε ∈ (0, 2], (T1(x)+(−ε, ε))∩D∩T2(x) =
{
{2} if x ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2);
φ if x = 1.
For ε ∈ (2,∞), (T1(x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩D ∩ T2(x) = {2} for each x ∈ (0, 2).
Then, we have that for each ε > 0, T V(1,2)(x) = {2} for each x ∈ [0, 2] and
the correspondence T V(1,2) is lower semicontinuous and has nonempty values.
We conclude that the pair (T1, T2) is dual almost w-lower semicontinuous
with respect to D.
3. A new fixed point theorem
We obtain a fixed point theorem which is an extension of Wu’s fixed point
Theorem 1 in [18], in the sense that, for each i ∈ I, the involved correspon-
dence Si is assumed to be almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to a
set Di, but Di is not convex as in the quoted result.
Theorem 6. Let I be an index set. For each i ∈ I, let Xi be a nonempty
convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space Ei, Di
be a nonempty compact convex metrizable subset of Xi and Si, Ti : X :=∏
i∈I
Xi → 2
Xi be two correspondences with the following conditions:
1) for each x ∈ X , Si(x) ⊂ Ti(x).
2) Si is almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to Di and S
Vi
i is
convex nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex symmetric neigh-
bourhood Vi of 0 in Ei.
Then there exists x∗ ∈ D :=
∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗
i ∈ Ti(x
∗) for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Since Di is compact, D :=
∏
i∈I
Di is also compact in X. For each
i ∈ I, let ßi be a basis of open absolutely convex symmetric neighbour-
hoods of zero in Ei and let ß=
∏
i∈I
ßi. For each system of neighbourhoods
V = (Vi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi, let’s define the corespondences S
Vi
i : X → 2
Di, by
SVii (x) = (Si(x)+Vi)∩Di, x ∈ X, i ∈ I. By assumption 2) each S
Vi
i is l.s.c with
nonempty closed convex values. According to Theorem 1.1 in [12], there ex-
ists a nonempty valued, upper semicontinuous correspondence GVii : D → 2
Di
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such that GVii (x) ⊂ S
Vi
i (x) for all x ∈ D. Then, by Theorem 7.3.5 in [8] and
Theorem 1.4 pag. 25 in [21], the correspondence F Vii =clcoG
Vi
i : D → 2
Di is
also upper semicontinuous with nonempty closed convex values. Let’s define
F V : D → 2D by F V (x) =
∏
i∈I
F Vii (x) for each x ∈ D. The correspondence
F V is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values. Therefore, according
to Himmelberg’s fixed point theorem [7], there exists x∗V =
∏
i∈I
x∗Vi ∈ D such
that x∗ ∈ F V (x∗). It follows that x∗Vi ∈ S
Vi
i (x
∗
V ) for each i ∈ I.
For each V = (Vi)i∈I ∈ß, let’s define QV = ∩i∈I{x ∈ D : xi ∈ S
Vi
i (x)}.
QV is nonempty since x
∗
V ∈ QV , then QV is nonempty and closed.
We prove that the family {QV : V ∈ ß} has the finite intersection prop-
erty.
Let {V (1), V (2), ..., V (n)} be any finite set of ß and let V (k) =
∏
i∈I
V
(k)
i , k =
1, ..., n. For each i ∈ I, let Vi =
n
∩
k=1
V
(k)
i , then Vi ∈ ßi; thus V =
∏
i∈I
Vi ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi.
Clearly QV ⊂
n
∩
k=1
QV (k) so that
n
∩
k=1
QV (k) 6= ∅.
SinceD is compact and the family {QV : V ∈ ß} has the finite intersection
property, we have that ∩{QV : V ∈ ß} 6= ∅. Take any x
∗ ∈ ∩{QV : V ∈ß},
then for each Vi ∈ ßi, x
∗
i ∈ S
Vi
i (x
∗). Acording to Lemma 1, we have that
x∗i ∈ Si(x
∗), for each i ∈ I, therefore x∗i ∈ T (x
∗).
If |I| = 1 we get the result bellow.
Corollary 7. Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff locally
convex topological vector space F, D be a nonempty compact convex metrizable
subset of X and S, T : X → 2X be two correspondences with the following
conditions:
1) for each x ∈ X, S(x) ⊂ T (x) and S(x) 6= ∅,
2) S is almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to D and SV is convex
nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex symmetric neighbourhood
V of 0 in E.
Then, there exists a point x∗ ∈ D such that x∗ ∈ T (x∗).
In the particular case that the correspondence S = T the following result
stands.
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Corollary 8. Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff locally con-
vex topological vector space F, D be a nonempty compact convex metrizable
subset of X and T : X → 2X be an almost w- lower semicontinuous corre-
spondence with respect to D and T V is convex nonempty valued for each open
absolutely convex symmetric neighborhood V of 0 in E. Then, there exists a
point x∗ ∈ D such that x∗ ∈ T (x∗).
4. Applications in equilibrium theory
Let I be a nonempty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let Xi be a
nonempty topological vector space representing the set of actions and define
X :=
∏
i∈I
Xi; let Ai, Bi : X → 2
Xi be the constraint correspondences and Pi
be the preference correspondence for the agent i.
Definition 4 (21). An abstract economy Γ = (Xi, Ai, Pi, Bi)i∈I is a family
of ordered quadruples (Xi, Ai, Pi, Bi).
The notion of equilibrium plays a central role in the theory of equilibrium.
In the recent years the generalizations of this concept have been made in some
directions, several of them enlarging the set of acceptable points. One of these
methods is due to Yuan [21], who divided each constraint correspondence
into two parts, A and B, because the set of the fixed points of the ”small”
correspondence may not be rich enough. Another method leads us to the
notion of ”pseudo-equilibrium” and we will define it further.
Here, for the definition of the equilibrium we follow Yuan [21].
Definition 5 (21). An equilibrium for Γ is a point x∗ ∈ X such that for
each i ∈ I, x∗i ∈ Bi(x
∗) and Ai(x
∗) ∩ Pi(x
∗) = ∅.
Remark 5. When, for each i ∈ I, Ai(x) = Bi(x) for all x ∈ X, this abstract
economy model coincides with the classical one introduced by Borglin and
Keiding in [2]. If, in addition, Bi(x) =clXiBi(x) for each x ∈ X, which is
the case if Bi has a closed graph in X × Xi, the definition of equilibrium
coincides with that one used by Yannelis and Prabhakar in [20].
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Remark 6. An example of extension of the equilibrium model considering
two constraint correspondences Ai,Bi : X → 2
Xi for each player i (with
Ai(x) ⊂ Bi(x), x ∈ X) is the notion of quasi-equilibrium (see [6]) for an
abstract economy, which has an analogue in the private ownership economies.
Even if Florenzano considers in [6] that the interest of the quasi-equilibrium
concept is purely mathematical, she motivates the research of the conditions
which guarantee its existence as being very fruitful from a lot of points of
view.
The following example motivates the necessity of Yuan’s model of ab-
stract economy with two constraint correspondences and illustrates it by
using correspondences for which the assumptions formulated by us hold, but
those made by Yannelis and Brahbakar [20] or by other authors (and which
concern the lower semicontinuity) do not hold.
Example 5. Let Γ = (X,A,B, P ) be an abstract economy with one agent,
where X = [0, 4] and A,B, P : X → 2X are defined below:
A(x) =


[1− x, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1);
[3, 4] if x = 1;
[0, 1
2
] if x ∈ (1, 4];
P (x) =


[3
2
, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1);
{4} if x = 1;
[1, 2] if x ∈ (1, 4];
B(x) =


[1− x, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1);
[3, 4] if x = 1;
[0, 2] if x ∈ (1, 4].
The fixed point set of A is Fix(A) = [1
2
, 1), the fixed point set of B is
Fix(B) = [1
2
, 1) ∪ (1, 2] and A(x) ⊆ B(x) for each x ∈ [0, 4]. Since U = {x ∈
X : (A∩P )(x) = ∅) = [1, 4] and Fix(A)∩U = ∅, Yannelis-Prahbakar’s model
([20]) (X,A, P ) has not equilibrium points.
We notice that x∗ = 3
2
is an equilibrium point for Yuan’s model (X,A,B, P ) :
(A∩P )(3
2
) = ∅, 3
2
∈ B(3
2
). The correspondence A proves to not have enough
fixed points and it must be enlarged by the correspondence B.
B, P and A are almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to D = [0, 2]
and the game (X,A,B, P ) has equilibrium points, as we showed above.
Since P−1(4) = {x ∈ X : 4 ∈ P (x)} = {1}, the correspondence P has
not open lower sections. We also see that the correspondences A,B and P
are not lower semicontinuous on [0, 4].
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There is large literature concerning the existence of the equilibrium in
Yuan’s sense, which has been developed in the last decades. The authors
tried to generalize the properties of the involved correspondences; for an
overview, see for example [15] or [21]. In [21], Yuan provides applications
of abstract economies with two constraint correspondences to the systems
of generalized quasi-variational inequalities and to the systems of Ky Fan
minimax inequalities.
We define the following type of equilibrium for an abstract economy,
which is a slight extension of Yuan’s equilibrium. The motivation of intro-
ducing it is a mathematical one.
Definition 6. A pseudo equilibrium for Γ is defined as a point x∗ ∈ X such
that for each i ∈ I, x∗i ∈ Bi(x
∗) and x∗ ∈cl{x ∈ X : (Ai ∩ Pi)(x) = ∅} for
each i ∈ I.
Example 6. Let Γ = (X,A,B, P ) be an abstract economy with one agent,
where X = [0, 4] and A,B, P : X → 2X are defined below:
A(x) =


[1− x, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1);
[1, 4] if x = 1;
[0, 1
2
] if x ∈ (1, 4];
P (x) =


[3
2
, 2 + x] if x ∈ [0, 1);
{1} if x = 1;
[1, 2] if x ∈ (1, 4];
B(x) =


[1− x, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1);
[1, 4] if x = 1;
[0, 2] if x ∈ (1, 4].
(A ∩ P )(x) =


[3
2
, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1);
{1} if x = 1;
∅ if x ∈ (1, 4].
We note that x∗ = 1 and x∗ = 3
2
are pseudo-equilibrium points for Γ,
since 1 ∈ B(1), 3
2
∈ B(3
2
) and 1, 3
2
∈cl{x ∈ X : (A ∩ P )(x) = ∅} = [1, 4].
Having a utility function ui : X ×Xi → R for each agent i, we can define
a preference correspondence Pi: Pi(x) := {yi ∈ Xi : ui(x, yi) > ui(x, xi)} .
Then, the condition of maximizing the utility function to obtain the equilib-
rium point becomes: Ai(x) ∩ Pi(x) = ∅ for each i ∈ I.
Now we give an example of correspondence P which is w-lower semi-
continuous with respect to a given set, P being constructed from a utility
function.
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Example 7. Let G be the game ([−1, 1], A, P ) with I = {1}, A : [−1, 1] →
2[−1,1] be defined as
A(x) =
{
[0, 1], if x ∈ [−1, 0);
(1
2
, 1] x ∈ [0, 1].
and
let u : [−1, 1]× [−1, 1]→ R be the function with levels defined as
u(x, y) =


1, if (x, y) ∈ [−1, 0)× [−1, 1) ∪ [0, 1]× [−1, 0]\{(0, 0)};
2 if (x, y) ∈ [−1, 0)× {(1)};
3 if (x, y) ∈ {(0, 0)} ∪ {0} × [0, 1
2
);
4 if (x, y) ∈ {0} × [1
2
, 1];
5 if (x, y) ∈ (0, 1]× (0, 1);
6 if (x, y) ∈ (0, 1]× {1}.
Then P : [−1, 1]→ 2[−1,1] is defined as
P (x) := {y ∈ X : u(x, y) > u(x, x)}
P (x) =


{1}, if x ∈ [−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1);
[1
2
, 1] if x = 0;
φ if x = 1.
P is not lower semicontinuous.
Let V = (−ε, ε) and D = [1, 2].
P (x) + V =


(1− ε, 1 + ε), if x ∈ [−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1);
(1
2
− ε, 1 + ε) if x = 0;
φ if x = 1.
For ε ∈ (0, 1],
P V (x) =
{
[1, 1 + ε), if x ∈ [−1, 1);
φ if x = 1.
For ε > 1,
P V (x) =
{
[1, 2], if x ∈ [−1, 1);
φ if x = 1.
P is w-lower semicontinuous with respect with D = [1, 2].
A(x) ∩ P (x) =


{1}, if x ∈ [−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1);
(1
2
, 1] if x = 0;
φ if x = 1.
A(1) ∩ P (1) = φ, and, since 1 ∈ A(1), we have that x∗ = 1 is an equilib-
rium point for G.
As an application of the fixed point theorem proved in Section 3, we have
the following result.
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Theorem 9. Let Γ = {Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi}i∈I be an abstract economy such that
for each i ∈ I, the following conditions are fulfilled:
1) Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological
vector space Ei and Di is a nonempty compact convex metrizable subset of
Xi;
2) for each x ∈ X =
∏
i∈I
Xi, Ai (x) and Pi(x) are convex and Bi (x) is
nonempty, convex and Ai (x) ⊂ Bi(x);
3) Wi = {x ∈ X : Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x) 6= ∅} is closed in X;
4) Hi : X → 2
Xi defined by Hi (x) = Ai(x) ∩ Pi (x) for each x ∈ X is
almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to Di on Wi and H
Vi
i is convex
nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex symmetric neighbourhood
Vi of 0 in Ei;
5) Bi : X → 2
Xi is almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect to Di and
BVii is convex nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex symmetric
neighbourhood Vi of 0 in Ei;
6) for each x ∈ X , xi /∈ (Ai ∩ Pi) (x).
Then there exists x∗ ∈ D =
∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗
i ∈ Bi (x
∗) and x∗ ∈cl{x ∈
X : (Ai ∩Pi)(x) = ∅} for each i ∈ I (x
∗ is a pseudo equilibrium point for Γ).
Proof. Let i ∈ I. By condition 3) we know that Wi is closed in X.
Let’s define Ti : X → 2
Xi by Ti (x) =
{
Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x) , if x ∈ Wi,
Bi (x) , if x /∈ Wi
for
each x ∈ X.
Then Ti : X → 2
Xi is a correspondence with nonempty convex values. We
shall prove that Ti : X → 2
Di is almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect
to Di. Let ßi be a basis of open absolutely convex symmetric neighbourhoods
of 0 in Ei and let ß=
∏
i∈I
ßi. For each V = (Vi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi, for each x ∈ X, let
for each i ∈ I
BVi(x) = (Bi (x) + Vi) ∩Di,
F Vi(x) = ((Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x)) + Vi) ∩Di and
T Vii (x) =
{
F Vi(x), if x ∈ Wi,
BVi(x), if x /∈ Wi.
For each closed set V ′i in Di, the set{
x ∈ X : T Vii (x) ⊂ V
′
i
}
=
=
{
x ∈ Wi : F Vi(x) ⊂ V
′
i
}
∪
{
x ∈ X rWi : BVi(x) ⊂ V
′
i
}
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=
{
x ∈ Wi : F Vi(x) ⊂ V
′
i
}
∪
{
x ∈ X : BVi(x) ⊂ V ′i
}
.
According to condition 6), the set
{
x ∈ Wi : F Vi(x) ⊂ V
′
i
}
is closed in
X . The set
{
x ∈ X : BVi(x) ⊂ V ′i
}
is closed in X because BVi is lower
semicontinuous.
Therefore, the set
{
x ∈ X : T Vii (x) ⊂ V
′
i
}
is closed in X. It shows that
T Vii : X → 2
Di is lower semicontinuous. According to Theorem 2, there exists
x∗ ∈ D =
∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗ ∈ T i (x
∗) , for each i ∈ I. By condition 6) we
have that x∗i ∈ Bi (x
∗) and x∗ ∈cl{x ∈ X : (Ai ∩ Pi)(x) = ∅} for each i ∈ I.
Example 8. Let Γ = {Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi}i∈I be an abstract economy, where I =
{1, 2, ..., n}, Xi = [0; 4] be a compact convex choice set, Di = [0, 2] for each
i ∈ I and X =
∏
i∈I
Xi.
Let A = {x ∈ X : ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1] and ∃j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such
that xj = 1} and let the correspondences Ai, Bi, Pi : X → 2
Xi be defined as
follows:
for each (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ X,
Ai(x) =


[1− xi, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
[3, 4] if x ∈ A;
[0, 1
2
], otherwise;
Pi(x) =


[3
2
, 2 + xi] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
{4} if x ∈ A;
[1, 2], otherwise;
Bi(x) =


[1− xi, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
[3, 4] if x ∈ A;
[0, 2], otherwise.
The correspondences Ai, Bi, Pi are not lower semicontinuous on X.
Ai(x) ∩ Pi(x) =


[3
2
, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
{4} if x ∈ A;
φ, otherwise.
Wi = {x ∈ X : Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x) 6= ∅} = [0, 1]
n is closed in X.
(Ai ∩ Pi) (x) =


[3
2
, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
[3
2
, 2] ∪ {4} if x ∈ A;
φ, otherwise.
We notice that for each x ∈ X , xi /∈ (Ai ∩ Pi) (x) .
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We shall prove that Bi and (Ai∩Pi)Wi are almost w-lower semicontinuous
with respect to Di = [0, 2].
On Wi,
(Ai ∩ Pi) (x) =
{
[3
2
, 2] if x ∈ X , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
{4} if x ∈ A;
(Ai∩Pi) (x)+(−ε, ε) =
{
(3
2
− ε, 2 + ε) if x ∈ X , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
(4− ε, 4 + ε) if x ∈ A;
Let (Ai ∩ Pi)
V (x) = ((Ai ∩ Pi) (x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩ [0, 2], where V = (−ε, ε).
Then,
if ε ∈ (0, 3
2
],
(Ai ∩ Pi)
V (x) =
{
(3
2
− ε, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
φ if x ∈ A;
if ε ∈ (3
2
, 2],
(Ai ∩ Pi)
V (x) =
{
[0, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
φ if x ∈ A;
if ε ∈ (2, 4],
(Ai ∩ Pi)
V (x) =
{
[0, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
(4− ε, 2] if x ∈ A;
and if ε > 4,
(Ai ∩ Pi)
V (x) = [0, 2] if x ∈ [0, 1]n.
Hence, for each V = (−ε, ε), (Ai ∩ Pi)V Wi is lower semicontinuous and
has nonempty values.
Bi (x)+(−ε, ε) =


(1− xi − ε, 2 + ε) if x ∈ X , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
(3− ε, 4 + ε) if x ∈ A;
(−ε, 2 + ε) otherwise.
Let Bi
V (x) = (Bi (x) + (−ε, ε)) ∩ [0, 2], where V = (−ε, ε).
Then,
if ε ∈ (0, 1],
Bi
V (x) =


(1− xi − ε, 2] if x ∈ X, xi ∈ [0, 1− ε],
∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} \ {i}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
[0, 2] if x ∈ X, xi ∈ (1− ε, 1),
∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} \ {i}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
φ if x ∈ A;
[0, 2] otherwise;
if ε ∈ (1, 3], Bi
V (x) =


[0, 2] if x ∈ X and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, xj ∈ [0, 1);
(3− ε, 2] if x ∈ A;
[0, 2] otherwise.
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and if ε > 3, Bi
V (x) = [0, 2] if x ∈ X.
Then, for each V = (−ε, ε), BVi is lower semicontinuous and has nonempty
values.
Therefore, all hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisfied, so that there exists
an equilibrium point x∗ = {3
2
, 3
2
, ..., 3
2
} ∈ X such that x∗i ∈ Bi (x
∗) and
(Ai ∩ Pi)(x
∗) = ∅.
Theorem 4 deals with abstract economies which have dual w-lower semi-
continuous pairs of correspondences and can be compared with Theorem 5
in Wu [19].
Theorem 10. Let Γ = {Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi}i∈I be an abstract economy such that
for each i ∈ I, the following conditions are fulfilled:
1) Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological
vector space Ei and Di is a nonempty compact convex metrizable subset of
Xi;
2) for each x ∈ X =
∏
i∈I
Xi, Pi(x) ⊂ Di, and Bi (x) is nonempty;
3) the set Wi = {x ∈ X : Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x) 6= ∅} is open in X;
4) the pair (Ai|clWi, Pi|clWi) is dual almost w-lower semicontinuous with
respect to Di, Bi : X → 2
Xi is almost w-lower semicontinuous with respect
to Di;
5) if Ti,Vi : X → 2
Xi is defined by Ti,Vi(x) = (Ai(x) + Vi)∩Di ∩ Pi(x) for
each x ∈ X, then the correspondences BVii and Ti,Vi are nonempty convex
valued for each open absolutely convex symmetric neighbourhood Vi of 0 in
Ei;
6) for each x ∈ X , xi /∈ P i (x);
Then, there exists x∗ ∈ D =
∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗
i ∈ Bi (x
∗) and Ai (x
∗) ∩
Pi (x
∗) = ∅ for all i ∈ I.
Proof. For each i ∈ I, let ßi denote the family of all open absolutely
convex symmetric neighbourhoods of zero in Ei and let ß=
∏
i∈I
ßi. For each
V =
∏
i∈I
Vi ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi, for each i ∈ I, let
BVi(x) = (Bi (x) + Vi) ∩Di for each x ∈ X and
SVii (x) =
{
Ti,Vi(x), if x ∈ clWi,
BVii (x), if x /∈ clWi,
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SVii has closed values. Next, we shall prove that S
Vi
i : X → 2
Di is lower
semicontinuous.
For each closed set V ′ in Di, the set{
x ∈ X : SVii (x) ⊂ V
′
}
=
=
{
x ∈ clWi : Ti,Vi(x) ⊂ V
′
}
∪
{
x ∈ X r clWi : B
Vi
i (x) ⊂ V
′
}
=
{
x ∈ clWi : Ti,Vi(x) ⊂ V
′
}
∪
{
x ∈ X : BVii (x) ⊂ V
′
}
.
We know that the correspondence Ti,Vi(x)|clWi : clWi → 2
Di is lower semi-
continuous. The set
{
x ∈ clWi : Ti,Vi(x) ⊂ V
′
}
is closed in clWi, and hence
it is also closed in X because clWi is closed in X . Since B
Vi
i (x) : X → 2
Di
is lower semicontinuous, the set {x ∈ X : BVii (x)} ⊂ V
′ is closed in X
and therefore the set
{
x ∈ X : SVii (x) ⊂ V
′
}
is closed in X . It showes that
SVii : X → 2
Di is lower semicontinuous. According to Wu’s Theorem 1,
applied for the correspondences SVii = T
Vi
i , there exists a point x
∗
V ∈ D =∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗
Vi
∈ T Vii (x
∗
V ) for each i ∈ I. By condition 5), we have that
x∗Vi /∈ Pi (x
∗
V ) , hence, x
∗
V i /∈ A
Vi
i (x
∗
V ) ∩ Pi (x
∗
V ).
We also have that clGr(Ti,Vi) ⊆ clGr(A
Vi
i )∩clGrPi.Then Ti,Vi(x) ⊆ A
Vi
i (x) ∩
Pi (x) for each x ∈ X. It follows that x
∗
V i /∈ Ti,Vi(x
∗
V ). Therefore, x
∗
V i ∈
BVi (x∗V ) .
For each V = (Vi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi, let’s define QV = ∩i∈I{x ∈ D : x ∈ BVi (x)
and Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x) = ∅}.
QV is nonempty since x
∗
V ∈ QV , and it is a closed subset of D according
to 3). Then, QV is nonempty and compact.
Let ß=
∏
i∈I
ßi. We prove that the family {QV : V ∈ ß} has the finite inter-
section property.
Let {V (1), V (2), ..., V (n)} be any finite set of ß and let V (k) =
∏
i∈I
V
(k)
i i∈I ,
k = 1, ..., n. For each i ∈ I, let Vi =
n
∩
k=1
V
(k)
i , then Vi ∈ ßi; thus V ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi.
Clearly QV ⊂
n
∩
k=1
QV (k) so that
n
∩
k=1
QV (k) 6= ∅.
SinceD is compact and the family {QV : V ∈ ß} has the finite intersection
property, we have that ∩{QV : V ∈ ß} 6= ∅. Take any x
∗ ∈ ∩{QV : V ∈ß},
then for each V ∈ ß,
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x∗ ∈ ∩i∈I
{
x∗ ∈ D : x∗i ∈ B
Vi (x) and Ai (x) ∩ Pi (x) = ∅)
}
.
Hence, x∗i ∈ B
Vi (x∗) for each V ∈ß and for each i ∈ I. According to
Lemma 1, we have that x∗i ∈ Bi(x
∗) and (Ai ∩ Pi)(x
∗) = ∅ for each i ∈ I.
Now we introduce the next concept which also generalizes the lower semi-
continuous correspondences.
Let X be a non-empty convex subset of a topological linear space E, Y
be a non-empty set in a topological space and K ⊆ X × Y.
Definition 7. The correspondence T : X×Y → 2X has the e-LSCS-property
(e-lower semicontinuous selection property) on K, if for each absolutely con-
vex neighborhood V of zero in E, there exists a lower semicontinuous cor-
respondence with convex values SV : X × Y → 2X such that SV (x, y) ⊂
T (x, y)+clV and x /∈clSV (x, y) for every (x, y) ∈ K.
The following theorem concerns the abstract economies which have cor-
respondences with e-LSCS-property.
Theorem 11. Let Γ = (Xi, Ai, Pi, Bi)i∈I be an abstract economy, where I
is a (possibly uncountable) set of agents such that for each i ∈ I :
1) Xi is a non-empty compact set in a Hausdorff locally convex topological
vector space Ei;
2) Bi is w-lower semicontinuous with nonempty convex values;
3) the set Wi : = {x ∈ X / (Ai ∩ Pi) (x) 6= ∅} is open;
4) (Ai ∩ Pi) has the e-LSCS-property on Wi.
Then there exists an equilibrium point x∗ ∈ X for Γ, i.e., for each i ∈ I,
x∗i ∈ Bi(x
∗) and (Ai ∩ Pi)(x
∗) = ∅ for each i ∈ I.
Proof. For each i ∈ I, let ßi denote the family of all open absolutely
convex neighborhoods of zero in Ei. Let V = (Vi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi. Since (Ai ∩ Pi)
has the e-LSCS-property on Wi, it follows that there exists a lower semi-
continuous correspondence F Vii : X → 2
Xi with convex values such that
F Vii (x) ⊂ (Ai ∩ Pi)(x) + Vi and xi /∈clF
Vi
i (x) for each x ∈ Wi.
Let’s define the correspondence T Vii : X → 2
Xi , by
T Vii (x) :=
{
F Vii (x), if x ∈ clWi,
(Bi(x) + Vi) ∩Xi, if x /∈ clWi.
BVi : X → 2Xi, BVi(x) = (Bi(x) + Vi) ∩ Xi is lower semicontinuous
according to the assumption 2).
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Let U be an closed subset of Xi, then
U
′
:= {x ∈ X | T Vii (x) ⊂ U}
={x ∈clWi | T
Vi
i (x) ⊂ U} ∪ {x ∈ X\clWi | T
Vi
i (x) ⊂ U}
=
{
x ∈ clWi | F
Vi
i (x) ⊂ U
}
∪ {x ∈ X | (Bi(x) + Vi) ∩Xi ⊂ U}
U
′
is a closed set, because clWi is closed,
{
x ∈ clWi | F
Vi
i (x) ⊂ U
}
is
closed since F Vii (x) is lower semicontinuous map on clWi and the set
{x ∈ X | (Bi(x) + Vi) ∩Xi ⊂ U} is closed since (Bi(x)+Vi)∩Xi is lower
semicontinuous. Then T Vii is lower semicontinuous on X. By Theorem 7.3.3
in [8], clT Vii is lower semicontinuous and has closed convex values.
Since X is a compact convex set, by Wu’s fixed-point theorem [18], there
exists x∗V ∈ X such that for each i ∈ I, (x
∗
V )i ∈clT
Vi
i (x
∗
V ). If x
∗
V ∈clWi,
(x∗V )i ∈clF
Vi
i (x
∗
V ), which is a contradiction.
Hence, (x∗V )i ∈cl[(Bi(x
∗
V )+Vi)∩Xi] and (Ai∩Pi)(x
∗
V ) = ∅. We have that
(x∗V )i ∈cl[(Bi(x
∗
V ) + Vi) ∩Xi] ⊂ B
Vi(x∗V ).
Let’s define QV = ∩i∈I{x ∈ X : xi ∈ BVi(x) and (Ai ∩ Pi)(x) = ∅}. We
have that x∗V ∈ QV , then QV 6= ∅ and so it is a non-empty closed subset of
X by 3) and hence QV is compact.
We prove that the family {QV : V ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi} has the finite intersection
property.
Let {V (1), V (2), ..., V (n)} be any finite set of
∏
ßi
i∈I
and let V (k) =
∏
i∈I
V
(k)
i ,
where V
(k)
i ∈ßi for each i ∈ I. Let Vi =
n
∩
k=1
V
(k)
i , then Vi ∈ ßi; thus V =∏
i∈I
Vi ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi. Clearly, QV ⊂
n
∩
k=1
QV (k) so that
n
∩
k=1
QV (k) 6= ∅.
Therefore, the family {QV : V ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi} has the finite intersection property.
Since X is compact, we have that ∩{QV : V ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi} 6= ∅. Let’s take any x
∗ ∈
∩{QV : V ∈
∏
i∈I
ßi}, then for each i ∈ I and each Vi ∈ ßi, x
∗
i ∈ B
Vi(x∗) and
(Ai∩Pi)(x
∗) = ∅; but then, x∗i ∈ Bi(x
∗) from Lemma 1 and (Ai∩Pi)(x
∗) = ∅
for each i ∈ I.
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5. The model of a generalized multiobjective game and the exis-
tence of generalized Pareto equilibrium
The purpose of this section is to make a preliminary unitary presentation
of the model of a constrained multicriteria game in its strategic form and of
the solution concepts for this type of game, and also to state an existence
result for generalized Pareto equilibria.
Let I be a finite set (the set of players). For each i ∈ I, let Xi be the
set of strategies and define X =
∏
i∈I Xi. Let T
i : X → 2R
ki , where ki ∈ N,
be the multicriteria payoff function and let Ai : X → 2Xi be a constraint
correspondence.
Definition 8 (9). The family G = (Xi, A
i, T i)i∈I is called a generalized mul-
ticriteria (multiobjective) game.
Any n-tuple of strategies can be regarded as a point in the product space
of sets of players’ strategies: x = (x1, x2, ...xn) ∈ X. For each player i ∈ I,
the vector of the n− 1 strategies of the other ones will be denoted by x−i =
(x1, ...xi−1, xi+1, ...xn) ∈ X−i =
∏
j∈I\{i}Xi. We note that x = (x−i, xi).
We assume that each player is trying to minimize his/her own payoff
according to his/her preferences, where for each player i ∈ I, the preference
” &i ” over the outcome space R
ki is the following:
z1 &i z
2 if only if z1j ≥ z
2
j for each j = 1, 2, ...ki and z
1, z2 ∈ Rki. The
following preference can be defined on X for each player i (see [9]):
x &i y whenever F
i(x) &i F
i(y) and x, y ∈ X.
Let x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n) ∈ X.
We introduce slight generalizations of the equilibrium concepts defined
by Kim and Ding in [9].
Definition 9. A strategy x∗i ∈ Xi of player i is said to be a generalized
Pareto efficient strategy (respectively, a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with
respect to x if x∗i ∈ A
i(x∗) and there is no strategy xi ∈ A
i(x∗) such that
T i(x∗)−T i(x∗i−1, xi) ∈ R
ki
+\{0} (respectively, T
i(x∗)−T i(x∗i−1, xi) ∈intR
ki
+\{0}).
Definition 10. A strategy x∗ ∈ X is said to be a generalized Pareto equilib-
rium (respectively, a weak Pareto equilibrium) of a game G = (Xi, A
i, T i)i∈I ,
if for each player i ∈ I, x∗i ∈ Xi is a Pareto efficient strategy against x
∗
(respective, a generalized weak Pareto efficient strategy against x∗).
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The following notion contains the idea of a game equilibrium defined by
using a scalarization function. In this case, the scalarization method uses
weighted coefficients Wi, so that each player i has his own vector of weights
Wi ∈ R
ki
+\{0}.
Definition 11. A strategy x∗ ∈ X is said to be a generalized weighted Nash
equilibrium with respect to the weighted vector W = (Wi)i∈I with Wi =
(Wi,1,Wi,2,
...,Wi,ki) ∈ R
ki
+ of the multiobjective game G = ((Xi, A
i, T i)i∈I if for each
player i ∈ I, we have
1) x∗i ∈ A
i(x∗);
2) Wi ∈ R
ki
+\{0};
3) for all xi ∈ A
i(x∗), Wi · T
i(x∗) ≤ Wi · T
i(x∗−i, xi), where · denotes the
inner product in Rki.
Remark 7. In particular, if Wi ∈ ∆
ki = {ui ∈ R
ki
+ with
∑ki
j=1 ui,j = 1} for
each i ∈ I, then the strategy x∗ ∈ X is said to be a normalized generalized
weighted Nash equilibrium with respect to W.
Remark 8. If for each i ∈ I, Ai has closed values and a closed graph in X×
Xi, the notions of equilibrium introduced above coincide with the equilibrium
notions defined by Kim and Ding in [9].
The relationship between the two types of equilibrium notions is given by
the following result.
Lemma 12. Each normalized generalized weighted Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈
X with a weight W = (W1, ...Wn) ∈ ∆
k1 × ... × ∆kn (respectively, W =
(W1, ...,Wn) ∈ int∆
k1×...×int∆kn) is a weak Pareto equilibrium (respectively,
a Pareto equilibrium) of the game G = ((Xi, A
i, T i)i∈I .
The proof follows the same line as the proof of Lemma 7 in [9].
Remark 9. As in [9], the above lemma remains true whenW = (W1, ...,Wn)
satisfies Wi ∈ R
ki
+ (resp. Wi ∈intR
ki
+ ).
In order to prove the existence result for generalized weighted Nash equi-
librium of generalized multiobjective games, first we prove the following
lemma.
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Lemma 13. Let X be a nonempty convex compact of a Hausdorff locally
convex topological vector space E, D be a nonempty compact convex and
metrizable subset of X, A : X → 2X be a correspondence with non-empty
convex values and f : X ×X → R be a function such that:
1) A is almost weakly lower semicontinuous with respect to D and AV
is convex nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex symmetric neigh-
bourhood V of 0 in E;
2) The correspondence F : X → 2X , F (x) = {y ∈ X : f(x, x)− f(y, x) >
0} is almost weakly lower semicontinuous with respect to D on K = {x ∈
X : x ∈ A(x)} and F V is convex valued for each open absolutely convex
symmetric neighbourhood V of 0 in E;
3) x /∈ F (x) for each x ∈ K;
then there exists x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ ∈ A(x∗) and f(x∗, x∗) ≤ f(y, x∗)
for each y ∈ A(x∗).
Proof. We notice first that the set K = {x ∈ X : x ∈ A(x)} is closed.
Assume that for each x ∈ K, A(x) ∩ F (x) 6= φ and define the correspon-
dence G : X → 2X by
G(x) =
{
A(x) ∩ F (x) if x ∈ K;
A(x) if x /∈ K.
By 1) and 3), the correspondence GV : X → 2X is lower semicontinuous
for each open absolutely convex symmetric neighbourhood V of 0 in E, and
has nonempty convex closed values (we can prove this fact by using an ar-
gument similar with that one from the Theorem 3). By Corollary 2, there
exists x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ ∈ G(x∗). By definition of G and A, x∗ must be
in K. It follows that x∗ ∈ A ∩ F (x∗), and since clGrA ∩ F ⊂clGrA∩clGrF ,
we have that x∗ ∈ A(x∗) ∩ F (x∗), that is x∗ ∈ F (x∗), which contradicts 3).
Therefore, there exists x∗ ∈ K such that A(x∗)∩F (x∗) = φ (this implies also
A(x∗) ∩ F (x∗) = φ). Hence
x∗ ∈ A(x∗) and f(x∗, x∗) ≤ f(y, x∗) for each y ∈ A(x∗).
Example 9. Let f : [−1, 1]× [−1, 1]→ R,
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f(x, y) =


1 if (x, y) = (−1, 0);
2 if (x, y) = (0, 0);
1 if x, y ∈ [0, 1)× [0, 1]\{(0, 0)};
2 if (x, y) ∈ (1
2
, 1]× [−1, 0);
3 if (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1
2
]× [−1, 0) ∪ {(−1, 0)× {0}};
4 if (x, y) ∈ [−1, 0)× (0, 1];
0 if (x, y) ∈ {1} × (0, 1];
Let A : [−1, 1]→ 2[−1,1] defined by A(x) = [−1, 0] if x ∈ [−1, 1].
A is lower semicontiuous on [−1, 1] and K = {x ∈ [−1, 1] : x ∈ A(x)} =
[−1, 0] is closed.
F : X → 2X , F (x) = {y ∈ X : f(x, x)− f(y, x) > 0}
F (x) =


(1
2
, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0);
{−1} if x = 0;
{1} if x ∈ (0, 1].
F is not lower semicontinuous and x /∈ F (x), ∀x ∈ K = [−1, 0], where
FK(x) =
{
[1
2
, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0);
{−1} ∪ [1
2
, 1] if x = 0;
We also have that for each V = (−ε, ε) with ε > 0, and D = [0, 1], F V|K is
lower semicontinuous.
Therefore,
F|K(x) + (−ε, ε) =
{
(1
2
− ε, 1 + ε) if x ∈ [−1, 0);
(−1 − ε,−1 + ε) if x = 0;
For ε ∈ (0, 1
2
], F V|K(x) =
{
(1
2
− ε, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0);
φ if x = 0;
For ε ∈ (1
2
, 1], F V|K(x) =
{
[0, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0);
φ if x = 0;
For ε ∈ (1, 2], F V|K(x) =
{
[0, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0);
[0,−1 + ε) if x = 0;
For ε > 2, F V|K(x) = [0, 1], x ∈ [−1, 0].
Then,
For ε ∈ (0, 1
2
], F V|K(x) = [
1
2
− ε, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0];
For ε > 1
2
F V|K(x) = [0, 1] if x ∈ [−1, 0];
F V|K is lower semicontinuous and nonempty convex valued.
By Lemma 3, we have that there is x∗ ∈ A(x∗) such that A(x∗)∩F (x∗) =
φ.
For example, x∗ = −1
2
, -1
2
∈ A(−1
2
) and -1
2
/∈ F (−1
2
), that is 3 =
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f(−1
2
,−1
2
) ≥ f(y,−1
2
) = 3 for each y ∈ A(−1
2
) = [−1, 0].
Now, as an application of Lemma 3, we have the following existence theo-
rem of generalized weighted Nash equilibrium for generalized multiobjective
games.
Theorem 14. Let I be a finite set of indices, let (Xi, A
i, T i)i∈I be a con-
strained multi-criteria game with for each i ∈ I, Xi is a nonempty convex sub-
set of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space Ei and suppose that
there is a nonempty compact convex and metrizable subset D of X =
∏
i∈I Xi
and a weighted vector W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn) with Wi ∈ R
ki
+\{0} such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
1) for each i ∈ I, Ai is almost weakly lower semicontinuous with respect
to D and Ai,Vi is convex nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex
symmetric neighbourhood Vi of 0 in Ei;
2) The set K = {x ∈ X : x ∈ A(x)}, where A(x) =
∏
i∈I A
i(x), is closed
in X;
3) The correspondence F : X → 2X , F (x) = {y ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi) − T
i(x−i, yi)) > 0} is almost weakly lower semicontinuous with
respect to D on K and F V is convex valued for each open absolutely convex
symmetric neighbourhood V of 0 in E;
4) x /∈ F (x) for each x ∈ K;
then there exists x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ is a generalized weighted Nash
equilibria with respect to W.
Proof. Define the function f : X × X → R by f(x, y) =
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi)− T
i(x−i, yi)), (x, y) ∈ X ×X. It is easy to see that f satisfies
all hypothesis of Lemma 3, hence there exists x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ ∈ A(x∗)
and
∑n
i=1Wi · (T
i(x∗−i, x
∗
i ) − T
i(x∗−i, yi) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ A(x
∗). We use the
fact that
∏
i∈I A
i ⊆
∏
i∈I A
i ⊆
∏
i∈I A
i. We obtain first x∗i ∈ Ai(x
∗) for each
i ∈ I. For any given i ∈ I and any given yi ∈ A
i(x∗), let y = (x∗−i, yi). Then
Wi · (T
i(x∗−i, x
∗
i )− T
i(x∗−i, yi)) =
=
∑n
j=1Wj ·(T
j(x∗−i, x
∗
i )−T
i(x∗−i, yi))−
∑
j 6=iWj ·(T
j(x∗−i, x
∗
i )−T
i(x∗−i, yi))
=
∑n
j=1Wj · (T
j(x∗−i, x
∗
i )− T
i(x∗−i, yi)) ≤ 0.
Therefore, we have Wi · (T
i(x∗−i, x
∗
i )− T
i(x∗−i, yi)) ≤ 0 for each i ∈ I and
yi ∈ A
i(x∗). Hence, x∗ is a generalized weighted Nash equilibrium of the
game G with respect to W.
By using Lemma 3, we obtain the following existence theorem of gener-
alized Pareto equilibrium as a consequence of Theorem 6.
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Theorem 15. Let I be a finite set of indices, let (Xi, A
i, T i)i∈I be a con-
strained multi-criteria game with for each i ∈ I, Xi is a nonempty convex sub-
set of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space Ei and suppose that
there is a nonempty compact convex and metrizable subset D of X =
∏
i∈I Xi
and a weighted vector W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn) with Wi ∈ R
ki
+\{0} such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
1) for each i ∈ I, Ai is almost weakly lower semicontinuous with respect
to D and Ai,Vi is convex nonempty valued for each open absolutely convex
symmetric neighbourhood Vi of 0 in Ei;
2) The set K = {x ∈ X : x ∈ A(x)}, where A(x) =
∏
i∈I A
i(x), is closed
in X;
3) The correspondence F : X → 2X , F (x) = {y ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi) − T
i(x−i, yi)) > 0} is almost weakly lower semicontinuous with
respect to D on K and F V is convex valued for each open absolutely convex
symmetric V of 0 in E;
4) x /∈ F (x) for each x ∈ K;
then there exists x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ is a generalized weak Pareto equi-
librium.
Furthermore, if Wi ∈intR
ki
+\{0} for all i ∈ I, then x
∗ is a generalized
Pareto equilibrium.
The author thanks to Professor Joa˜o Paulo Costa from the University of
Coimbra for the fruitfull discussions and for the hospitality he proved during
the visit to his departament.
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